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The opening pages of Freud’s ‘The Uncanny’ focus on those aesthetic experiences that part company 
with ‘feelings of a positive nature’ and induce instead sensations of ‘repulsion and distress’ (U1: 
219). Freud owes the realisation of this variety of experience to Ernst Jentsch, a doctor and 
psychologist, who in his essay ‘On the Psychology of the Uncanny’ (1906), is less interested in what 
constitutes the uncanny than in the ‘psychical processes’ that generate its impression.1 Jentsch 
dedicates substantial attention to ‘doubt as to whether an apparently living being is animate and, 
conversely, doubt as to whether a lifeless object may not in fact be animate’; he goes on to specify 
that ‘this doubt only makes itself felt obscurely in one’s consciousness’.2 Jentsch then turns his focus 
to literature and professes a particular fascination with those instances in which it is unclear 
whether the reader ‘has a human person or rather an automaton before him in the case of a 
particular character’.3 He goes on to highlight real-life instances of ‘people who are delirious, 
intoxicated, ecstatic’, but he also mentions sufferers of epilepsy and the more ‘limited alienating 
effect’ of the hysterical attack.4 In this, he is drawing on a major turn-of-the-century preoccupation 
with automatism, also registered, most strikingly perhaps, in the work of Henri Bergson, who 
expresses a deep concern with the body as ‘matter’ that has a tendency to ossify and become rigid, 
and that perpetually threatens to thwart the animating impulses of spirit. As Jentsch seems to 
acknowledge, and as Freud himself will have known from his days as a student at the Salpêtrière 
Hospital in Paris in 1885, automatisms are also a major preoccupation of nineteenth-century 
neurology, and particularly of the work of Jean-Martin Charcot, who studied ‘hysterico-epilepsy’ and 
Parkinson’s disease, and saw free will as a ‘metaphysical’ invention.5  
Writing about the uncanny in 1919, Freud returns to these notions. Referring to Jentsch’s 
preoccupation with ‘epileptic fits’ and ‘insanity’, he elaborates, while not fully accepting Jentsch’s 




behind the ordinary appearance of mental activity’ (U1: 226).  But I want here to focus on a more 
quotidian and concealed form of automatism, for Freud also twice refers to the German Romantic 
philosopher, Friedrich Schelling, who writes that ‘“The Unheimlich” is the name for everything that 
ought to have remained . . . secret and hidden but has come to light’ (U1: 224).  
As both Jentsch and Freud acknowledge, the uncanny makes a particularly striking 
appearance in works of literature. One such example is James Joyce’s high-modernist novel, Ulysses 
(1922), a book about the homely or heimlich, about ordinary or everyday events, but one in which 
the Unheimlich also makes regular and arresting appearances. In the ‘Calypso’ episode, for instance, 
Leopold Bloom sets off to purchase a kidney for breakfast. As he leaves the house, ‘His hand took his 
hat from the peg over his initialled heavy overcoat’.6 What is notable in Joyce’s prose is that the 
subject of the sentence is not Bloom himself, but his hand, which seems to perform the action 
independently – one might say automatically – without engaging Bloom’s intentional mind.7 When 
Bloom returns from the butcher’s, where ‘His hand accepted the moist tender gland’, he fries the 
kidney, eats it with relish, prepares breakfast for his wife, and, on his way to the outhouse suddenly 
remembers his hat: ‘Where is my hat, by the way? Must have put it back on the peg. Or hanging up 
on the floor. Funny, I don’t remember that’.8 In describing this strange, ‘funny’ feeling of a habitual 
action performed without conscious intention or knowledge, Joyce draws attention to a prominent, 
hidden aspect of the everyday: the manner in which the body initiates and performs habitual actions 
without the engagement of the conscious mind.  
In T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land, another high-modernist text also published in 1922, the typist 
who makes an appearance in Section III (‘The Fire Sermon’) has a sordid sexual encounter with ‘the 
young man carbuncular’. Afterwards, we learn,  
 
She turns and looks a moment in the glass, 




Her brain allows one half-formed thought to pass: 
‘Well now that’s done: and I’m glad it’s over.’ 
When lovely woman stoops to folly and 
Paces about her room again, alone, 
She smoothes her hair with automatic hand  
And puts a record on the gramophone.9  
 
Thinking, in Eliot’s poem, is represented as ‘half-formed’ (l. 251), and as governed by another 
physiological organ, the brain, while the actions of the typist are presented in a hostile and coldly 
mechanical manner, embodied in her ‘automatic hand’ – something that is also implied by her 
profession (l. 255).10 What both of these examples stage is a familiar variety of automatic action –
what we call habit – which presents a challenge to received understandings of what it is to be 
human because it seems to entail an absence of reflection, intentionality and agency, to constitute 
an alienation from the self, and to involve a form of automatism. In their emphasis on these 
everyday actions, Joyce and Eliot bring something ‘secret and hidden’ to light: the uncanny self-
alienation of automaticity that is involved in habits. 
The noun ‘habit’ comes to the English language from the Old French, ‘habit’ or ‘abit’, which 
in turn originates in the Latin noun ‘habitus’, from the verb ‘habere’, to have – or in its reflexive 
form, ‘to be constituted; to be’. The noun therefore seems to suggest that habits contain something 
essential to subjective experience – to suggest, even, that habits are what we are. In his extended 
essay, Of Habit (1838), Félix Ravaisson’s analysis seems to accord with this etymology. Ravaisson 
divides habits into two main groups: firstly, there are habits that originate in an intentional act, such 
as learning to play a musical instrument or to speak a foreign language, to practise certain sports or 
to dance – actions to which we dedicate attention and effort. Secondly, there are habits that 
originate in ‘passivity’, in which the organism is bombarded by stimuli, to which it habituates itself 




addiction.11 Ravaisson’s thinking radically departs from the philosophical understanding of habit as 
‘an obstacle to knowledge’, in that it results in ease, facility and power, and can even produce 
exceptional physical elegance, beauty and style;12 but he also conceives of habit in terms of the 
machinic and, at times, in terms of pathological repetition, for habit is characterised by 
‘[i]nflammations, spasms, convulsions’, which make ‘regular appearances’ without any ‘determining 
cause in the material of the organism’.13 Drawing substantially on medical textbooks of his time, 
Ravaisson proposes that chronic illness is a habit. He argues that a fever that by chance has occurred 
regularly ‘tends to convert itself into periodic affection’ such that ‘the periodicity becomes essential 
to it’.14 
For Ravaisson, however, an intentional habit is formed as ‘an idea that gradually naturalizes, 
an action that, as a result of repetition, imperceptibly moves from the understanding and the will to 
nature’.15 What originates in conscious effort becomes, paradoxically and by insensible degree, 
second nature. Habit, in this analysis, bridges the gap between will or consciousness on the one 
hand and the matter and automated functions of the body on the other; habit forms a complex 
ontology to which virtually everything integral to the subject can be traced. Ravaisson argues that 
‘Habit is an acquired nature, a second nature that has its ultimate ground in primitive nature’: 
becoming second nature, habit replaces instinctual behaviour, which in humans is all-but lost.16 As 
Joyce and Eliot suggest, habit brings something critical but concealed to light: our habits unveil the 
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